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Approved For Release 2004/12/22 : CIA-RDP80M01133A000800060013-1

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15 AUG 1975

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Copy No. 2

14 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) Alert List

1. The attached memo to Mr. Colby responds to his interest in the SWS Alert List. Specifically, he is concerned with the degree questions in the Alert List are answered and the impact of these questions on analysts and collectors. Major Anselmo was your action officer on this item.

2. Mr. Colby addressed his questions on the Alert List to the DDI and the NIOs as well as to the IC Staff. The DDI action officer, [redacted] recommended to Mr. Proctor that the IC Staff response serve also as the DDI response because our findings were similar. Mr. Proctor agreed, and your memorandum to Mr. Colby reflects this. The NIO response, however--which consists of personal NIO perceptions rather than those of collectors and analysts--is being forwarded separately by Mr. Carver. I suggest that you forward this through [redacted], who can be sure the two responses go to Mr. Colby together.

3. The findings are based on interviews with representatives from the SWS, DIA, CIA, State/INR, and NSA. In general, the comments from these representatives tracked with those expressed by [redacted] the Director of SWS.

4. No recommendations are suggested. Some minor problem areas that surfaced during the review are already being taken care of by the respective agency involved.

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5. As you already know, [REDACTED] has expressed concern about the lack of personnel support to the SWS by State/INR, Army, and Navy. This problem is not addressed in the memo to Mr. Colby because I understand you plan to bring this matter to Mr. Colby's attention in early September when the SWS will be discussed at USIB. As you requested, we are looking into this problem area and will forward a note for you to give to Mr. Colby in hopes of prodding some action on his part.

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Signed

[REDACTED]

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Attachment

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Distribution:

- Copy No. 1 - D/DCI/IC
- 2- IC Registry
- 3 - C/PRD (& PRD Chrono)
- 4 - Area Branch Subject
- 5 - RJA Chrono




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Copy No. 5

15 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff Alert List


1. A short time ago you expressed an interest in the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) Alert List, and how it is being used. This memorandum and the attachment responds to that question and also discusses the relationship of the Alert List to the Strategic Warning Staff Monthly Report.

2. The NIO office is also preparing a memo which will be forwarded separately. Whereas our review focused on the impact of the Alert List to collectors and analysts and includes DDI views, the NIO survey reflects the personal perceptions of the individual NIOs on the effectiveness and utility of the Alert List.

3. In brief, the Alert List appears to have more impact on analysts than on collectors, and the field commands appear to be more sensitive to it than the Washington community. NSA and the field commands have been particularly responsive to the Alert List, and this has been helpful to the SWS. CIA, DIA, and the Air Force have also reacted positively in support of the Alert List while Army, Navy, and the State Department intelligence services have limited their response to answering specific tasks.


4. Some steps are being taken to improve the utility of the Alert List. For example, CIA has requested that SWS analysts be listed by name and phone number with each item in the Alert List. Also, in the interests of improving support to the SWS mission, distribution of the two publications within CIA and DIA is being broadened.

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[REDACTED]

5. I believe your interest in this question--which stimulated the attached IC Staff survey--has had a salutary effect on the SWS machinery and will raise the level of both field and headquarters support. I have no specific recommendations at this time, but I will provide you with some talking points for you to use at the USIB meeting in early September that will discuss the SWS Monthly Report.

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[REDACTED]

Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Attachment

MOR, [REDACTED] w/o SWS
Monthly Report

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Copy No. 3
8 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Strategic Warning Staff Alert List

1. A short time ago the DCI expressed interest on the impact of the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS) Alert List which was published on 17 July 1975. Rather than limit our review to this specific issue, we considered the effect of the SWS Alert List in more general terms, including its relationship to the Monthly Report--also published by the SWS.

2. Concerning the question on the extent to which Alert List items are answered: we would note that the Alert List is meant to be essentially a "prodding mechanism." Formal written responses are not required, but informal reaction to the Alert List or additional information is welcome.

3. [redacted] the Director of SWS, believes the Alert List is doing its job satisfactorily. He singled out field responses as being most helpful, especially those from EUCOM, PACOM, US Forces Korea, Taiwan Defense Command, and Air Defense Command. He believes the Alert List has had an obvious impact on the analysts working for these commands and has definitely generated field collection requirements. (See Attachment 1 for examples of two field responses to items on the 17 July 1975 SWS Alert List). One of the reasons the field commands respond so well is that they had been in the habit of responding weekly to the old Watch Committee's preliminary agenda. In fact, one of the reasons for initiating the Alert List was to take advantage of the work cycle already followed by the various field commands to support the former Watch Committee and the National Indications Center.


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4. Among intelligence agencies in the Washington community, the situation is somewhat different. NSA has been especially helpful and cooperative in responding informally to Alert List queries, particularly those that have been earmarked for publication in the SWS Monthly Report. [redacted] Chief of Intelligence Support at the National SIGINT Operations Center (NSOC), stated that NSA analysts are encouraged to respond to items on the Alert List and tasked to respond to those items which will be addressed in the SWS Monthly Report. NSA analysts also take action to alert collectors if, after group discussion, satisfactory answers to Alert List questions cannot be resolved. As a result, NSA's contribution to the Alert List and the Monthly Report has been especially helpful and cooperative.

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5. DIA provides adequate distribution of the Alert List to the analysts but does not task its people to respond. However, analysts are encouraged to do so and, according to the Acting Chief, Indications and Warning Reconnaissance Support Branch, initiatives have begun within the last few weeks for more responsiveness to both the Alert List and Monthly Report. Up to now DIA analysts appear to have been driven by their own production requirements, although they have contributed some support on an analyst-to-analyst level with the SWS.

6. In DIA's Directorate for Collections, [redacted] Chief of Requirements Division (DC-3) stated that he and his people are aware of the Alert List but view it as somewhat historical. His people work very closely with the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) personnel and go over an alert list of their own on a daily basis. Therefore, the SWS Alert List is considered a summary of warning and indicator items rather than a list that drives collection requirements. It acts as a weekly barometer for areas of tension. Thus it is useful for those not normally involved in such activity on a daily basis as are DC and NMIC analysts.


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7. CIA's response to the Alert List is similar to DIA's. [redacted] DDI/OCI Indications Officer, has indicated that the Alert List does prod CIA analysts to discuss

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certain items with SWS personnel, and formal contributions have occasionally been provided. Since no response is required, analysts do not feel compelled to submit written contributions. Analysts, however, do coordinate on the "Monthly Report" and give it more attention than the SWS Alert List. The impact of the Alert List on CIA collection, such as DDO, appears to have been minimal up to now. Steps are being taken to broaden dissemination of the Alert List, and this may improve the situation.

8. State/INR analysts are aware of the Alert List but do not contribute directly. On occasion, views are exchanged with [redacted] or members of his staff. According to Mr. Robert Baraz, Director, Office of Political-Military Affairs and Theater Forces, State/INR views the SWS Alert List as a preview of things that the people in the field are looking for. State/INR analysts use the Alert List as it may or may not apply in their own research and production requirements. The SWS Monthly Report is considered a SWS function, and State/INR contributes little in the way of suggestions. However, the Monthly Report serves as a focal point for analysts working the problem, and State/INR analysts do coordinate on the draft. However, State's contribution seems to be, at best, "light coordination."

9. As for the Services, only US Air Force intelligence has been helpful in researching certain topics. Army and Navy intelligence analysts have not contributed but have been cooperative when the SWS has gone to them with specific queries.

10. One potential problem seems to be distribution of the Alert List and Monthly Report. Although the SWS does its job of getting the copies to the different agencies and offices, it is less clear that these recipients get the publications out to all that may have an interest, particularly the collectors. CIA is now taking action to realign and expand distribution of the Alert List to include DDO desks covering areas such as the PRC, USSR, and Korea. DIA's distribution is satisfactory except that the Deputy Director for Attaches and Human Resources is not on the distribution list for either the Alert List or the Monthly Report. Since attaches are important intelligence collectors, it would seem appropriate that at least the division chiefs

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in this Directorate should see each publication. Steps are now being taken by the SWS to insure distribution to this Directorate.

11. We found that the majority of topics suggested in the 17 July 1975 Alert List were addressed in the 24 July 1975 Monthly Report (Attachment 2). Of those not covered, contributions were received from field commands and either the data were superseded by events or the SWS is holding the intelligence for further analysis. For example, one item in the 17 July Alert List concerned Chinese Navy developments during the past several years. Response was good, but the SWS is researching the topic further before publishing its findings.

12. In general, we found that the Alert List does have an impact on analysts--more so in the field commands than the Washington community. We have found the impact to be somewhat less on collectors. NSA and the field commands have been especially responsive and helpful to the SWS. CIA, DIA, and Air Force have also been supportive while State/INR, Army, and Navy have limited their response to support when asked. To facilitate support to the SWS, CIA has requested that the name and phone number of the SWS analyst appear with each item in the Alert List. This has been done, beginning with the 31 July Alert List. Also, in the interest of improving support to the SWS mission, distribution of the two publications within CIA and DIA is being expanded. The IC Staff survey also has generated renewed interest in the subject documents, and we expect some increase in the use and support of both the Alert List and Monthly Report.

Signed

Major, USAF

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Attachments

1. Field Responses to SWS Alert List
2. SWS Monthly Report, 24 July 1975

Distribution:

- Copy No. 1 - [redacted]
2 - C/PRD (& PRD Chrono)
3 - IC Registry
4 - Area Br. Subject
5 - RJA Chrono

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Remarks: <p>This note to Mr. Colby is in response to the attached buckslip in which he raised some questions about the utility of the Strategic Warning Staff Alert List. As you will note DDI, IC Staff and NIO all had action on this matter. In discussions with [] ICS, it was clear that our responses were taking different routes and, therefore, no attempt was made for coordination though the DDI's comments will be incorporated in the ICS answer. [] and I agreed that it would be best to forward our notes to you to ensure that they are clipped together so that Mr. Colby will receive one package on the subject rather than two separate ones.</p>			
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DCI/DDCI

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5	DDI	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDA			16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

I'd be interested in
the degree these questions
a. are answered
b. have an impact on
analysts
c. have an impact on
collectors

DCI/DCI

7/19/75

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Hand 5j!
1065-75

13 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

SUBJECT : Strategic Warning Staff Alert List

1. In response to your expressed interest in the Strategic Warning Staff Alert List, and how it is being used, the National Intelligence Officers concerned have reviewed the questions posed in the 17 July Alert List.

2. Their general comments may be summarized as follows:

-- Several acknowledged that they had no current appreciation of Intelligence Community reactions to the Alert List and, thus, drew on experiences in their previous assignments for their comments. It was noted that in the past the Community and the unified commands responded promptly to similar issuances from the Watch Committee.

-- There was a feeling that the Alert List has potentially more utility to field commands and collectors than to Washington analysts, since the latter should be able to determine for themselves what are the key questions.

-- There are doubts that the Alert List is regarded as an action document for the Intelligence Community. Special collection actions would normally be proposed by current intelligence analysts (or by indications and warning centers) directly to collecting agencies as developments dictate. This means they would rarely result from circulation of an Alert List.

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- Following Communist military activity is a highest priority task of the entire intelligence apparatus. The subjects in the Alert List are usually not unique, and in most cases are being followed in some detail by current intelligence elements of several agencies.

3. The following comments deal more specifically (and to some extent more critically) with the questions contained in the 17 July Alert List:

- The Soviet/EE questions which relate to Warsaw Pact exercise activity and TU-95 reconnaissance, are standard and would be answered regardless of whether they appeared in an Alert List.
- Some of the questions themselves seem beyond the charter of an Alert List, or are out of focus.
 - The question of OKEAN-75 is beyond current intelligence. Evaluations of such a large-scale exercise cannot be usefully made in the near term, and interim replies stimulated by this question could be pernicious if mistakenly regarded as conclusive.
 - The question concerning Soviet advance notice of Arab or Israeli intentions to renew hostilities would be more relevant if directed to our perceiving Soviet reactions than to whether the Soviets get warning -- since the Soviets have the same problems as we do in obtaining such warning.
 - The question on Korea exhorts analysts and collectors to be alert to possible aggressive action from the North. What they should be told to look for are the indicators and questions which might be tip-offs to such action.

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4. I have no specific recommendations at this time. The National Intelligence Officers will, however, give continuing attention to the Alert List, and may produce further evaluations, as well as some recommendations, in the future.

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George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

cc: DDCI
D/DCI/IC ✓
DDI
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21 JUL 1975

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IC REGISTRY ROUTING SLIP

COMMENTS:

1-283

The DCI has asked for comments on the Alert List prepared by the Strategic Warning Staff.

A copy of this has gone to PRD. Do you want them to staff response?

Yes, to Gen Wilson - impressions
- John Clarke

Office	Init.	Date
3 D/DCI/IC		
2 AD/DCI/IC	<i>[Signature]</i>	
1 EO	<i>M</i>	7/21
PD/Plans		
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**Strategic
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Staff**

DCI

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ALERT LIST

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AL 17-75
17 July 1975

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No. 17-75

17 July 1975

STRATEGIC WARNING STAFF ALERT LIST

The SWS alert list contains inquiries and observations on subjects of warning intelligence interest which are currently under study in the SWS. Some of these subjects will be treated in the next monthly report of the SWS scheduled for publication on Thursday, 24 July. Contributions are requested by close of business Monday, 21 July.

I. USSR/EASTERN EUROPE

We would appreciate comments on the present status of training activity, particularly in Eastern Europe. There appears to have been relatively little significant Warsaw Pact exercise activity thus far this year, or even major Soviet exercise activity in Eastern Europe. At the same time, there have been at least three major Soviet exercises in other areas--Belorussia, Okean-75, and the recent Far East exercise. Have there been any indications of plans for a major Pact exercise this year? [REDACTED]

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Soviet naval reconnaissance Bear D aircraft have deployed to Cuba and Guinea. These deployments have now become routine--this is the 19th flight to Havana and the 10th to Conakry. While abroad, the aircraft usually have reconnoitered US carriers en route to the Mediterranean or US naval exercises off the US east coast. We would be interested, however, in any departures from the pattern of previous deployments, particularly flights to new areas of the Atlantic. [REDACTED]

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We are planning an item for our Monthly on the recent Soviet exercise in the Far East. At least one US command believes that the exercise was targeted entirely against the Chinese with no assumed US involvement. Other comments on this interpretation would be appreciated. [REDACTED]

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II. CHINA

We are interested in the 10-15 July exercise in the Shenyang Military Region. Was this in reaction to the Soviet Far East exercise or is there a possibility that it is related to the reported high-level conference in Peking? An assessment of the Chinese activity is requested. [REDACTED]

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It is our intent to discuss the improvements--both qualitative and quantitative--which have been observed in the Chinese Navy during the past several years. Topics to be covered include not only the upgrading of the South Sea Fleet and the deployment of missile boats into the fringes of the Taiwan Strait, but also the activity of the Golf-class and Han-class submarines and the recently-reported ASW torpedo. We solicit comments on the above topics and any additional material regarding naval improvements. []

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US firms drilling for oil in the Taiwan Straits--near-shore to Taiwan--have abandoned their efforts. Taiwan's China Petroleum Corporation, however, is seeking to lease a drilling rig and plans to move further offshore closer to mainland China. Previously, Peking warned US companies against moving further offshore. Do we expect China to react militarily if the Taiwanese begin drilling operations in the straits? []

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III. NORTH KOREA

There have been several conflicting reports in the recent past regarding North Korea's intentions toward the South, including some apparently planted by Pyongyang suggesting that it is planning a military attack on the South. While we do not believe that Pyongyang wants to waste the political and diplomatic gains it has made in recent months, nevertheless, there have been enough stories about Kim's aggressive intentions to continue a close watch for any indications of North Korean intentions. []

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IV. USSR/MIDDLE EAST

The increasing tensions in the Middle East, resulting from Egypt's announced decision not to renew the UN mandate in the Sinai, will necessitate a closer look at any Soviet activity related to the Middle East. Soviet-Egyptian relations remain strained, even to the point that there have been rumors that Sadat may renounce the friendship treaty with the USSR. At the same time, the USSR has a vital interest in retaining some assets in Egypt. In the event that Egypt or Israel should decide to renew hostilities in the Sinai, is it likely that Soviet Intelligence would receive prior warning? What is the present status of the [] MIG-25 reconnaissance aircraft based in Egypt? Are there any indications of increasing Soviet concern with the possibility of war in the area? []

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